U.S. Navy F/A-18F Super Hornet Armed with AGM-158C LRASM Shows How America Prepares for High-End Pacific Warfare
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A U.S. Navy F/A-18F Super Hornet carrying what is assessed to be an AGM-158C Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) has emerged as one of the most significant images from RIMPAC 2026, highlighting how the United States is refining carrier-based long-range maritime strike capabilities for a potential high-end conflict in the Indo-Pacific. Footage released by the U.S. Defense Visual Information Distribution Service on July 22, 2026, shows the aircraft with VX-9 test squadron markings during multinational sinking exercises near Hawaii, underscoring the Navy’s effort to integrate advanced anti-ship weapons, operational testing, and coalition warfare into a combat-ready kill chain.
The VX-9-marked Super Hornet points to more than a missile demonstration, as it suggests the Navy is validating how long-range anti-ship strikes can be executed using networked sensors, resilient targeting, and multinational coordination in realistic operational conditions. The combination of LRASM, carrier aviation, and allied force integration reflects a broader shift toward distributed maritime warfare designed to hold hostile surface fleets at risk across vast Indo-Pacific distances while strengthening deterrence against future naval aggression.
Related Topic: U.S. Apache Strike With Israeli SPIKE NLOS Missile Signals New Indo-Pacific Maritime Warfare Architecture
A VX-9 F/A-18F Super Hornet carrying an AGM-158C LRASM during RIMPAC 2026 highlights the U.S. Navy’s push for long-range, coalition-enabled maritime strike in the Indo-Pacific (Picture Source: Lockheed Martin / U.S. Navy/ Edited by Army Recognition Group)
On July 22, 2026, the U.S. Defense Visual Information Distribution Service released footage of multinational sinking exercises conducted near Hawaii during RIMPAC 2026. The video records U.S. and partner forces attacking the decommissioned USS Mobile Bay and USS Peleliu, but its most strategically revealing sequence shows a two-seat F/A-18F Super Hornet carrying a large AGM-158-family weapon, with VX-9 markings clearly visible. Beyond displaying an advanced missile loadout, the imagery provides a rare public glimpse into how the U.S. Navy is connecting operational testing, carrier aviation and coalition targeting for high-end maritime warfare in the Indo-Pacific.
VX-9 at the Center of Long-Range Maritime Strike
The tandem cockpit confirms the aircraft as an F/A-18F, while the visible VX-9 designation associates it with Air Test and Evaluation Squadron Nine. The externally carried weapon displays the low-observable body shape and general configuration associated with the AGM-158 family and is assessed to be an AGM-158C Long Range Anti-Ship Missile. The brief edited sequence does not provide a clear view of missile stencilling, an uninterrupted launch event or evidence establishing whether the round was live, inert or instrumented. Even with these limitations, the configuration is consistent with the known integration of LRASM on the Super Hornet and with its established role in U.S. carrier-based anti-surface warfare.
The VX-9 marking is more significant than the missile’s presence alone. VX-9 is not a conventional deployable strike-fighter squadron but an operational test unit tasked with evaluating weapons, sensors, electronic-warfare systems and mission software under conditions representative of combat. Its appearance during RIMPAC suggests that the Navy may be studying how the complete maritime strike process performs inside a multinational and multi-domain environment. Possible areas of assessment include mission-data preparation, target-track management, weapon loading, aircrew procedures, communications resilience and coordination with offboard sensors, although the specific objectives of the sortie have not been publicly disclosed.
This distinction separates the footage from a routine display of aircraft armament. LRASM is already an operational weapon, but the ability to carry and release it is only one component of combat effectiveness. A credible long-range anti-ship capability also depends on target detection, track validation, strike authorization, weapon programming, precise launch timing and reliable post-strike assessment. By placing a VX-9 aircraft inside a large coalition live-fire exercise, the U.S. Navy appears to be narrowing the distance between controlled testing and fleet-relevant employment. Whether the aircraft was a Block II or Block III Super Hornet cannot be confirmed visually and does not change the central assessment.
From Missile Carriage to Kill-Chain Warfare
The AGM-158C LRASM gives the F/A-18F a low-observable, long-range weapon designed to engage high-value surface targets in heavily defended maritime environments. Its precision routing, onboard guidance and target-discrimination capabilities are intended to preserve effectiveness when communications, satellite navigation or external intelligence support are disrupted. The weapon allows a carrier air wing to threaten major surface combatants from standoff distance while reducing the launch aircraft’s exposure to shipborne air-defense systems. The two-seat F/A-18F also offers a valuable human advantage: the weapon systems officer can support surface-track management, threat monitoring, communications and weapon preparation while the pilot concentrates on aircraft positioning, survivability and formation coordination.
The more exclusive implication is that the aircraft carrying LRASM does not need to be the platform that originally detected the target. Engagement-quality information could be developed by an E-2D Advanced Hawkeye, P-8A Poseidon, surface combatant, submarine, unmanned aircraft or allied sensor before being transferred into a joint targeting process. The Super Hornet may serve only as the final airborne shooter in a kill chain extending across hundreds or potentially thousands of kilometers. This separation between sensor and launcher makes the threat harder to anticipate because an opposing naval formation may detect the aircraft without knowing where the target track originated or whether other weapons are approaching from different domains. LRASM carriage imposes penalties in drag, fuel consumption, available stations and tanker demand, but those trade-offs purchase a mobile anti-ship capability that can be repositioned with the carrier strike group.
Geostrategic Implications for the Indo-Pacific
This configuration is tailored to several demanding operational scenarios. F/A-18Fs carrying LRASM could engage hostile surface action groups before they reach weapons-release positions against a U.S. carrier, allied fleet or strategically important island base. In a counter-amphibious mission, they could strike escorts, command ships, logistics vessels or large landing platforms while an invasion force remains in transit. The desired result would not always be immediate sinking. Disabling propulsion, sensors, flight operations or command systems could fracture the formation, delay its timetable and expose surviving ships to submarine, surface or land-based attacks. The same capability could help challenge a blockade, reopen reinforcement routes or prevent an adversary from establishing temporary sea control around a threatened ally.
The decisive challenge in such scenarios is not the performance of one missile but the generation of coordinated salvos. Carrier aircraft could launch LRASM from changing axes while submarines, surface combatants and land-based forces deliver additional weapons timed to arrive within the same defensive window. Electronic-attack aircraft could disrupt surveillance and fire-control systems as airborne early-warning and maritime-patrol assets maintain the targeting picture. Such an attack would force defending ships to divide radar coverage, interceptors and electronic-warfare resources across several directions. Its success would depend on persistent intelligence, aerial refuelling, secure mission planning, ammunition depth and the ability to reattack surviving vessels before the opposing force can reorganize.
RIMPAC 2026 reinforces the coalition dimension of this strategy. The exercise assembled 30 nations, 30 ships, five submarines, more than 190 aircraft and approximately 30,000 personnel, demonstrating the scale of the network the United States can mobilize during a regional crisis. Allied aircraft and ships can extend surveillance coverage, contribute target tracks, provide access to dispersed operating locations and complicate an adversary’s effort to identify the most important nodes in the strike architecture. The use of USS Mobile Bay and USS Peleliu also presented two different target profiles: a cruiser-sized combatant and a much larger amphibious assault ship. A sinking exercise cannot reproduce a maneuvering force protected by combat air patrols, decoys, electronic warfare and active missile defenses, but it can sharpen coalition procedures for targeting, strike sequencing, live-fire coordination and damage assessment against full-size naval hulls.
The image of a VX-9 F/A-18F carrying a weapon assessed as AGM-158C LRASM is one of the most consequential visuals released from RIMPAC 2026. It does not expose a specific operational plan, but it reveals the architecture behind America’s evolving approach to Indo-Pacific sea control: carrier-based standoff weapons, distributed sensors, operationally tested kill chains and allied combat integration. For U.S. partners, the footage demonstrates that American naval aviation continues to invest in reach, survivability and coalition interoperability. For any force considering maritime coercion, blockade or amphibious aggression, the message is direct: the United States is preparing not merely to launch anti-ship missiles, but to generate coordinated maritime strikes capable of disrupting an operation before it achieves its strategic objective.
Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.
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A U.S. Navy F/A-18F Super Hornet carrying what is assessed to be an AGM-158C Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) has emerged as one of the most significant images from RIMPAC 2026, highlighting how the United States is refining carrier-based long-range maritime strike capabilities for a potential high-end conflict in the Indo-Pacific. Footage released by the U.S. Defense Visual Information Distribution Service on July 22, 2026, shows the aircraft with VX-9 test squadron markings during multinational sinking exercises near Hawaii, underscoring the Navy’s effort to integrate advanced anti-ship weapons, operational testing, and coalition warfare into a combat-ready kill chain.
The VX-9-marked Super Hornet points to more than a missile demonstration, as it suggests the Navy is validating how long-range anti-ship strikes can be executed using networked sensors, resilient targeting, and multinational coordination in realistic operational conditions. The combination of LRASM, carrier aviation, and allied force integration reflects a broader shift toward distributed maritime warfare designed to hold hostile surface fleets at risk across vast Indo-Pacific distances while strengthening deterrence against future naval aggression.
Related Topic: U.S. Apache Strike With Israeli SPIKE NLOS Missile Signals New Indo-Pacific Maritime Warfare Architecture
A VX-9 F/A-18F Super Hornet carrying an AGM-158C LRASM during RIMPAC 2026 highlights the U.S. Navy’s push for long-range, coalition-enabled maritime strike in the Indo-Pacific (Picture Source: Lockheed Martin / U.S. Navy/ Edited by Army Recognition Group)
On July 22, 2026, the U.S. Defense Visual Information Distribution Service released footage of multinational sinking exercises conducted near Hawaii during RIMPAC 2026. The video records U.S. and partner forces attacking the decommissioned USS Mobile Bay and USS Peleliu, but its most strategically revealing sequence shows a two-seat F/A-18F Super Hornet carrying a large AGM-158-family weapon, with VX-9 markings clearly visible. Beyond displaying an advanced missile loadout, the imagery provides a rare public glimpse into how the U.S. Navy is connecting operational testing, carrier aviation and coalition targeting for high-end maritime warfare in the Indo-Pacific.
VX-9 at the Center of Long-Range Maritime Strike
The tandem cockpit confirms the aircraft as an F/A-18F, while the visible VX-9 designation associates it with Air Test and Evaluation Squadron Nine. The externally carried weapon displays the low-observable body shape and general configuration associated with the AGM-158 family and is assessed to be an AGM-158C Long Range Anti-Ship Missile. The brief edited sequence does not provide a clear view of missile stencilling, an uninterrupted launch event or evidence establishing whether the round was live, inert or instrumented. Even with these limitations, the configuration is consistent with the known integration of LRASM on the Super Hornet and with its established role in U.S. carrier-based anti-surface warfare.
The VX-9 marking is more significant than the missile’s presence alone. VX-9 is not a conventional deployable strike-fighter squadron but an operational test unit tasked with evaluating weapons, sensors, electronic-warfare systems and mission software under conditions representative of combat. Its appearance during RIMPAC suggests that the Navy may be studying how the complete maritime strike process performs inside a multinational and multi-domain environment. Possible areas of assessment include mission-data preparation, target-track management, weapon loading, aircrew procedures, communications resilience and coordination with offboard sensors, although the specific objectives of the sortie have not been publicly disclosed.
This distinction separates the footage from a routine display of aircraft armament. LRASM is already an operational weapon, but the ability to carry and release it is only one component of combat effectiveness. A credible long-range anti-ship capability also depends on target detection, track validation, strike authorization, weapon programming, precise launch timing and reliable post-strike assessment. By placing a VX-9 aircraft inside a large coalition live-fire exercise, the U.S. Navy appears to be narrowing the distance between controlled testing and fleet-relevant employment. Whether the aircraft was a Block II or Block III Super Hornet cannot be confirmed visually and does not change the central assessment.
From Missile Carriage to Kill-Chain Warfare
The AGM-158C LRASM gives the F/A-18F a low-observable, long-range weapon designed to engage high-value surface targets in heavily defended maritime environments. Its precision routing, onboard guidance and target-discrimination capabilities are intended to preserve effectiveness when communications, satellite navigation or external intelligence support are disrupted. The weapon allows a carrier air wing to threaten major surface combatants from standoff distance while reducing the launch aircraft’s exposure to shipborne air-defense systems. The two-seat F/A-18F also offers a valuable human advantage: the weapon systems officer can support surface-track management, threat monitoring, communications and weapon preparation while the pilot concentrates on aircraft positioning, survivability and formation coordination.
The more exclusive implication is that the aircraft carrying LRASM does not need to be the platform that originally detected the target. Engagement-quality information could be developed by an E-2D Advanced Hawkeye, P-8A Poseidon, surface combatant, submarine, unmanned aircraft or allied sensor before being transferred into a joint targeting process. The Super Hornet may serve only as the final airborne shooter in a kill chain extending across hundreds or potentially thousands of kilometers. This separation between sensor and launcher makes the threat harder to anticipate because an opposing naval formation may detect the aircraft without knowing where the target track originated or whether other weapons are approaching from different domains. LRASM carriage imposes penalties in drag, fuel consumption, available stations and tanker demand, but those trade-offs purchase a mobile anti-ship capability that can be repositioned with the carrier strike group.
Geostrategic Implications for the Indo-Pacific
This configuration is tailored to several demanding operational scenarios. F/A-18Fs carrying LRASM could engage hostile surface action groups before they reach weapons-release positions against a U.S. carrier, allied fleet or strategically important island base. In a counter-amphibious mission, they could strike escorts, command ships, logistics vessels or large landing platforms while an invasion force remains in transit. The desired result would not always be immediate sinking. Disabling propulsion, sensors, flight operations or command systems could fracture the formation, delay its timetable and expose surviving ships to submarine, surface or land-based attacks. The same capability could help challenge a blockade, reopen reinforcement routes or prevent an adversary from establishing temporary sea control around a threatened ally.
The decisive challenge in such scenarios is not the performance of one missile but the generation of coordinated salvos. Carrier aircraft could launch LRASM from changing axes while submarines, surface combatants and land-based forces deliver additional weapons timed to arrive within the same defensive window. Electronic-attack aircraft could disrupt surveillance and fire-control systems as airborne early-warning and maritime-patrol assets maintain the targeting picture. Such an attack would force defending ships to divide radar coverage, interceptors and electronic-warfare resources across several directions. Its success would depend on persistent intelligence, aerial refuelling, secure mission planning, ammunition depth and the ability to reattack surviving vessels before the opposing force can reorganize.
RIMPAC 2026 reinforces the coalition dimension of this strategy. The exercise assembled 30 nations, 30 ships, five submarines, more than 190 aircraft and approximately 30,000 personnel, demonstrating the scale of the network the United States can mobilize during a regional crisis. Allied aircraft and ships can extend surveillance coverage, contribute target tracks, provide access to dispersed operating locations and complicate an adversary’s effort to identify the most important nodes in the strike architecture. The use of USS Mobile Bay and USS Peleliu also presented two different target profiles: a cruiser-sized combatant and a much larger amphibious assault ship. A sinking exercise cannot reproduce a maneuvering force protected by combat air patrols, decoys, electronic warfare and active missile defenses, but it can sharpen coalition procedures for targeting, strike sequencing, live-fire coordination and damage assessment against full-size naval hulls.
The image of a VX-9 F/A-18F carrying a weapon assessed as AGM-158C LRASM is one of the most consequential visuals released from RIMPAC 2026. It does not expose a specific operational plan, but it reveals the architecture behind America’s evolving approach to Indo-Pacific sea control: carrier-based standoff weapons, distributed sensors, operationally tested kill chains and allied combat integration. For U.S. partners, the footage demonstrates that American naval aviation continues to invest in reach, survivability and coalition interoperability. For any force considering maritime coercion, blockade or amphibious aggression, the message is direct: the United States is preparing not merely to launch anti-ship missiles, but to generate coordinated maritime strikes capable of disrupting an operation before it achieves its strategic objective.
Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.
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• Land Defense News
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