Indonesia may acquire 42 J-10 fighter jets from China amid limited progress on US F-15EX agreement
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As reported by Intelligence Online on May 26, 2025, Indonesia is in the process of formalizing a plan to acquire 42 second-hand Chengdu J-10 Vigorous Dragon fighter aircraft from China, sourced directly from the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) inventory. The proposal, reported by multiple sources and partially confirmed in a now-deleted Facebook post by Indonesian Defense Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, indicates that Indonesian Air Force (TNI-AU) pilots are expected to be sent to China for training on the J-10 platform.Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this link
The J-10 fighters would be drawn directly from active Chinese Air Force squadrons, allowing for immediate delivery and limited delays associated with manufacturing lead times. (Picture source: Chinese MoD)
The procurement would represent a rapid-response solution to Indonesia’s aging fleet and could be officially announced during the Indo Defence Expo & Forum, scheduled for June 11–14, 2025. The J-10s would reportedly be removed from operational PLAAF squadrons, allowing accelerated transfer, and would likely undergo necessary modifications to meet Indonesian operational and export compliance requirements before handover.
The Indonesian Ministry of Defense has pursued multiple combat aircraft procurement efforts over the past decade following delays in replacing its retired Northrop F-5E/F Tiger II fleet. In 2015, the government planned to acquire 16 Su-35 Flanker fighters from Russia, but only 11 were contracted in 2018, with deliveries never materializing. This program was ultimately cancelled in 2021 due to the risk of U.S. secondary sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), as confirmed by the Indonesian Ministry of Defense in 2023. Indonesia subsequently pivoted toward Western suppliers, signing contracts with Dassault Aviation in 2022 for 42 Rafale F4 fighters. By August 2023, 24 aircraft had been officially ordered in two batches. Concurrently, Indonesia signed a memorandum with Boeing in 2023 for 24 F-15EX Eagle II aircraft, with the U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency estimating the deal’s value at up to $13.9 billion. The F-15EXs would be designated F-15IDN in Indonesian service.
A previously planned interim acquisition of 12 Mirage 2000-5 fighters from Qatar was later abandoned. Parallel to these programs, Indonesia participated in South Korea’s KF-X fighter project and expressed interest in Türkiye’s KAAN fifth-generation fighter. Despite these engagements, the long timelines and higher costs associated with acquiring new Western platforms prompted Jakarta to evaluate second-hand alternatives. According to Deputy Defense Minister Donny Ermawan Taufanto, China’s offer of the J-10 includes additional military equipment such as frigates and arms. He emphasized that system compatibility, pricing, and after-sales support are being reviewed. While he noted the proposal predates the April–May 2025 India–Pakistan conflict, he acknowledged that reports of the J-10’s operational use in downing Indian jets would be factored into the assessment. No Indonesian technical evaluation team has yet been dispatched to China.
The J-10 gained international attention following the May 2025 skirmishes between India and Pakistan, during which the Pakistan Air Force claimed that its J-10C fighters shot down multiple Indian aircraft, including Rafale EH, Mirage 2000H, Su-30MKI, and MiG-29UPG fighters, using PL-15 long-range air-to-air missiles. While India has not confirmed the losses, French intelligence sources reportedly acknowledged the potential combat loss of at least one Rafale. Analysts cited the use of airborne early warning and control platforms of Chinese and Swedish origin in coordination with the J-10s. The incident was the first reported combat use of the J-10, which is currently operated only by China and Pakistan. This operational record is now being highlighted by China in other J-10 export proposals, including one made to Colombia in May 2025. In that case, China offered 24 J-10CE fighters, weapon packages, and financing terms despite Colombia having previously selected the Swedish Gripen E/F.
Indonesia’s potential selection of the J-10 occurs alongside deepening bilateral ties with China. In January 2025, Indonesia joined the BRICS grouping and has pursued a closer strategic relationship with Beijing. President Prabowo Subianto visited China as president-elect and again shortly after taking office. During Chinese Premier Li Qiang’s visit to Jakarta in May 2025, Prabowo reiterated his intent to build a China-Indonesia community of destiny with regional and global influence. Indonesia’s trade with China rose from $52.45 billion in 2013 to $135.17 billion in 2024. China became Indonesia’s largest trading partner and top foreign investor, with $8.1 billion invested in 2024. These developments provide context for the evolving procurement policy that now includes evaluating Chinese fighter aircraft as part of a broader modernization effort.
If Indonesia confirms the J-10 acquisition, it would become the only country to operate the Rafale and J-10 simultaneously. With 24 Rafales on order and 42 J-10s proposed, Indonesia would operate a total of 66 canard-delta fighters. Indonesia also maintains a mixed fleet of American F-16s, Russian Su-27 and Su-30 aircraft, South Korean TA-50 trainers, and Hawk 209 light attack jets. The procurement of second-hand J-10s would address the capability gaps created by the retirement of the F-5 and the aging Hawk fleet. Although Rafale deliveries are set to begin in January 2026, the J-10s would be available for immediate delivery. This timeline aligns with Indonesia’s Defense Ministry emphasis on maintaining operational readiness during transition periods and could ensure continuity of service amid aircraft retirements and upgrades.
However, the integration of Chinese, French, and potentially Russian fighters poses significant operational and budgetary complications. The logistical burden of maintaining separate training pipelines, maintenance infrastructure, spare parts inventories, and weapons systems would increase complexity. Indonesia’s multi-vendor approach may enhance strategic flexibility, but it introduces high costs and coordination challenges. If Jakarta also revives the Su-35 deal, as some reports suggest, the combination of Chinese, French, and Russian fighters would result in an unprecedented level of supplier diversity within a single air force. This structure may complicate interoperability and sustainment while raising questions about long-term sustainability. Nonetheless, Jakarta appears willing to pursue this configuration as part of a broader strategy to maintain defense autonomy and hedge against political risks associated with overreliance on any one partner.
The decision to deprioritize the F-15EX deal in favor of Chinese and Russian alternatives reflects Indonesia’s recalibration of its procurement priorities. Boeing had pledged to meet Indonesia’s local content requirement by integrating 85 percent domestic components into F-15EX production. The move away from this program may affect U.S.-Indonesia industrial cooperation and broader defense relations. At the same time, Jakarta continues to engage with France, having signed a letter of intent during President Emmanuel Macron’s May 2025 state visit that could lead to further Rafale and Scorpène submarine orders. Indonesia also maintains agreements with French contractors for 13 long-range air surveillance radars from Thales and two domestically built Scorpène submarines with Naval Group and PT PAL. The Indo Defence Expo is expected to serve as a venue for confirming decisions on both Chinese and Russian aircraft, and any announcements would likely signal a long-term redefinition of Indonesia’s defense alignments.
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As reported by Intelligence Online on May 26, 2025, Indonesia is in the process of formalizing a plan to acquire 42 second-hand Chengdu J-10 Vigorous Dragon fighter aircraft from China, sourced directly from the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) inventory. The proposal, reported by multiple sources and partially confirmed in a now-deleted Facebook post by Indonesian Defense Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, indicates that Indonesian Air Force (TNI-AU) pilots are expected to be sent to China for training on the J-10 platform.
Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this link
The J-10 fighters would be drawn directly from active Chinese Air Force squadrons, allowing for immediate delivery and limited delays associated with manufacturing lead times. (Picture source: Chinese MoD)
The procurement would represent a rapid-response solution to Indonesia’s aging fleet and could be officially announced during the Indo Defence Expo & Forum, scheduled for June 11–14, 2025. The J-10s would reportedly be removed from operational PLAAF squadrons, allowing accelerated transfer, and would likely undergo necessary modifications to meet Indonesian operational and export compliance requirements before handover.
The Indonesian Ministry of Defense has pursued multiple combat aircraft procurement efforts over the past decade following delays in replacing its retired Northrop F-5E/F Tiger II fleet. In 2015, the government planned to acquire 16 Su-35 Flanker fighters from Russia, but only 11 were contracted in 2018, with deliveries never materializing. This program was ultimately cancelled in 2021 due to the risk of U.S. secondary sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), as confirmed by the Indonesian Ministry of Defense in 2023. Indonesia subsequently pivoted toward Western suppliers, signing contracts with Dassault Aviation in 2022 for 42 Rafale F4 fighters. By August 2023, 24 aircraft had been officially ordered in two batches. Concurrently, Indonesia signed a memorandum with Boeing in 2023 for 24 F-15EX Eagle II aircraft, with the U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency estimating the deal’s value at up to $13.9 billion. The F-15EXs would be designated F-15IDN in Indonesian service.
A previously planned interim acquisition of 12 Mirage 2000-5 fighters from Qatar was later abandoned. Parallel to these programs, Indonesia participated in South Korea’s KF-X fighter project and expressed interest in Türkiye’s KAAN fifth-generation fighter. Despite these engagements, the long timelines and higher costs associated with acquiring new Western platforms prompted Jakarta to evaluate second-hand alternatives. According to Deputy Defense Minister Donny Ermawan Taufanto, China’s offer of the J-10 includes additional military equipment such as frigates and arms. He emphasized that system compatibility, pricing, and after-sales support are being reviewed. While he noted the proposal predates the April–May 2025 India–Pakistan conflict, he acknowledged that reports of the J-10’s operational use in downing Indian jets would be factored into the assessment. No Indonesian technical evaluation team has yet been dispatched to China.
The J-10 gained international attention following the May 2025 skirmishes between India and Pakistan, during which the Pakistan Air Force claimed that its J-10C fighters shot down multiple Indian aircraft, including Rafale EH, Mirage 2000H, Su-30MKI, and MiG-29UPG fighters, using PL-15 long-range air-to-air missiles. While India has not confirmed the losses, French intelligence sources reportedly acknowledged the potential combat loss of at least one Rafale. Analysts cited the use of airborne early warning and control platforms of Chinese and Swedish origin in coordination with the J-10s. The incident was the first reported combat use of the J-10, which is currently operated only by China and Pakistan. This operational record is now being highlighted by China in other J-10 export proposals, including one made to Colombia in May 2025. In that case, China offered 24 J-10CE fighters, weapon packages, and financing terms despite Colombia having previously selected the Swedish Gripen E/F.
Indonesia’s potential selection of the J-10 occurs alongside deepening bilateral ties with China. In January 2025, Indonesia joined the BRICS grouping and has pursued a closer strategic relationship with Beijing. President Prabowo Subianto visited China as president-elect and again shortly after taking office. During Chinese Premier Li Qiang’s visit to Jakarta in May 2025, Prabowo reiterated his intent to build a China-Indonesia community of destiny with regional and global influence. Indonesia’s trade with China rose from $52.45 billion in 2013 to $135.17 billion in 2024. China became Indonesia’s largest trading partner and top foreign investor, with $8.1 billion invested in 2024. These developments provide context for the evolving procurement policy that now includes evaluating Chinese fighter aircraft as part of a broader modernization effort.
If Indonesia confirms the J-10 acquisition, it would become the only country to operate the Rafale and J-10 simultaneously. With 24 Rafales on order and 42 J-10s proposed, Indonesia would operate a total of 66 canard-delta fighters. Indonesia also maintains a mixed fleet of American F-16s, Russian Su-27 and Su-30 aircraft, South Korean TA-50 trainers, and Hawk 209 light attack jets. The procurement of second-hand J-10s would address the capability gaps created by the retirement of the F-5 and the aging Hawk fleet. Although Rafale deliveries are set to begin in January 2026, the J-10s would be available for immediate delivery. This timeline aligns with Indonesia’s Defense Ministry emphasis on maintaining operational readiness during transition periods and could ensure continuity of service amid aircraft retirements and upgrades.
However, the integration of Chinese, French, and potentially Russian fighters poses significant operational and budgetary complications. The logistical burden of maintaining separate training pipelines, maintenance infrastructure, spare parts inventories, and weapons systems would increase complexity. Indonesia’s multi-vendor approach may enhance strategic flexibility, but it introduces high costs and coordination challenges. If Jakarta also revives the Su-35 deal, as some reports suggest, the combination of Chinese, French, and Russian fighters would result in an unprecedented level of supplier diversity within a single air force. This structure may complicate interoperability and sustainment while raising questions about long-term sustainability. Nonetheless, Jakarta appears willing to pursue this configuration as part of a broader strategy to maintain defense autonomy and hedge against political risks associated with overreliance on any one partner.
The decision to deprioritize the F-15EX deal in favor of Chinese and Russian alternatives reflects Indonesia’s recalibration of its procurement priorities. Boeing had pledged to meet Indonesia’s local content requirement by integrating 85 percent domestic components into F-15EX production. The move away from this program may affect U.S.-Indonesia industrial cooperation and broader defense relations. At the same time, Jakarta continues to engage with France, having signed a letter of intent during President Emmanuel Macron’s May 2025 state visit that could lead to further Rafale and Scorpène submarine orders. Indonesia also maintains agreements with French contractors for 13 long-range air surveillance radars from Thales and two domestically built Scorpène submarines with Naval Group and PT PAL. The Indo Defence Expo is expected to serve as a venue for confirming decisions on both Chinese and Russian aircraft, and any announcements would likely signal a long-term redefinition of Indonesia’s defense alignments.
