Canada considers purchasing 72 Swedish Gripen fighters alongside U.S. F-35s in 140-fighter mixed fleet
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The Canadian federal government is evaluating a major procurement proposal to expand its planned fighter inventory into a mixed fleet of approximately 140 aircraft. The strategic initiative considers pairing 72 to 88 American-made Lockheed Martin F-35A Lightning II stealth fighters with up to 72 Canadian-assembled Saab Gripen E aircraft. This potential structural realignment follows an ongoing defense review initiated by the Carney administration to mitigate reliance on United States military supply chains and maximize domestic aerospace industrial benefits.
The proposed procurement framework expands the Royal Canadian Air Force fighter fleet from its original 88-aircraft projection to a three-tier layout comprising the F-35A for low-observable missions, the Gripen E for routine air defense, and the Saab GlobalEye for airborne early warning. This 140-aircraft baseline represents a return to Cold War-era operational capacities to address modern NORAD, Arctic surveillance, and NATO territorial sovereignty commitments.
Related topic: Canada considers cancelling part of U.S. F-35 order to buy 60 Swedish Gripen fighters
Canada is evaluating a major proposal to expand its planned fighter inventory into a mixed fleet of approximately 140 fighter jets, pairing 72 to 88 American-made F-35As with up to 72 Canadian-assembled Saab Gripen Es. (Picture source: NATO Air Command)
On June 6, 2026, CBC News reported that Canada was examining a proposal that could expand the planned fleet of 88 F-35As to a mixed fleet of about 140 fighter jets, combining 72 to 88 American F-35As with up to 72 Swedish Gripen Es assembled in Canada. La Presse had earlier placed the working mixed-fleet option at about 30 F-35As and 60 Gripen Es. The higher 140-aircraft option would move Canada from an Air Force structured around a single U.S.-made aircraft to a three-part layout: F-35A for low-observable and coalition missions, Gripen E for fighter mass and routine air defence, and GlobalEye for airborne surveillance and battle management.
Canada already has a firm order for 16 F-35As under a January 2023 agreement and paid for long-lead components for 14 additional airframes, but Ottawa has not politically closed the question of whether the full 88-aircraft F-35A plan should proceed. Canada operated 138 CF-18s in the 1980s, while the current CF-18 force is below 88 aircraft. A 140-aircraft inventory would therefore not be an abstract expansion, but a return to a Cold War-scale fighter force at a time when NORAD modernization, Arctic surveillance, missile warning, NATO commitments, U.S. tariff threats, national sovereignty, and industrial returns are all competing inside the same procurement decision.
Canada joined the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program in 1997, announced a 65-aircraft F-35 plan in 2010, and then moved into a more contested procurement process after cost and governance concerns. In December 2017, Ottawa launched an open competition for 88 fighters that included the F-35, Gripen, Rafale, Eurofighter Typhoon, and Super Hornet. Saab submitted its Gripen E proposal on July 31, 2020, built around Canadian assembly, sustainment, training, and technology transfer. Canada selected the F-35A and signed the January 2023 agreement for 88 aircraft, in an acquisition valued at C$19 billion, while broader program costs were later estimated at above C$27 billion.
The Carney government then ordered a review on March 15, 2025, one day after Mark Carney became prime minister, after renewed U.S. tariff pressure and a wider deterioration in bilateral trust highlighted Canada’s exposure to U.S.-controlled defence supply chains. Carney stated on March 25, 2025, that Canada could keep the 16 committed F-35As while examining other manufacturers for the remainder, and Defence Minister David McGuinty told Parliament on April 27, 2026, that the review remained underway and that Canada could still buy foreign fighters in addition to or instead of part of the original F-35 plan. The core F-35 issue is not whether the aircraft gives Canada a capability that the Gripen does not. It does.
The F-35A brings low observability, fused sensor data, electronic intelligence collection, passive detection options, secure data links, and compatibility with U.S.-led future air operations. A force of 72 to 88 F-35As would give the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) enough depth to allocate stealth fighters to NORAD quick-reaction alert, NATO rotations, operational conversion, training squadrons, maintenance downtime, and attrition reserve. The earlier 30-aircraft F-35A mixed-fleet option reported by La Presse would preserve access to the F-35’s capabilities, but it would sharply compress availability during overlapping crises, for example, if Canada needed fighters for NORAD alert in the north, NATO deterrence in Europe, pilot conversion, and depot-level maintenance at the same time.
The first 16 F-35As are effectively locked into the force, while the 14 aircraft tied to long-lead payments preserve production slots without equaling a final commitment to all 88. Lockheed Martin’s Canadian industrial case includes about 4,500 jobs, more than 30 Canadian companies, and projected opportunities of roughly C$15.5 billion through 2058, but the tradeoff is a sustainment model in which software releases, mission-data files, classified reprogramming, depot access, maintenance procedures, and future weapons integration remain embedded in a strict U.S.-controlled ecosystem. Therefore, the Swedish Gripen E would not replicate the F-35A’s role; it would change the balance between fleet size, national control, operating burden, and routine availability.
Saab’s fighter is powered by the GE F414-GE-39E turbofan producing about 98 kN of thrust with afterburner, reaches Mach 2, has a maximum takeoff weight of 16,500 kg, carries 10 external hardpoints, and has a combat radius of about 810 nautical miles with aerial refuelling. Its weapons options include Meteor missiles for beyond-visual-range air combat, IRIS-T for short-range engagements, AIM-120 AMRAAM for NATO interoperability, Taurus KEPD 350 for stand-off strike, precision-guided bombs, reconnaissance pods, and anti-ship weapons, depending on what Canada chooses to integrate. Its combat systems include the Raven ES-05 AESA radar, Skyward-G IRST, radar warning receivers, missile-approach warning, electronic countermeasures, and active expendable decoys.
Its most relevant Canadian attribute is the dispersed-operations model: short-runway use, road-based operations, rapid refuelling and rearming, and maintenance by small ground teams. That gives the Swedish fighter a plausible role in Arctic patrol, domestic air defence, NORAD alert reinforcement, pilot training throughput, and lower-cost daily flying, while leaving the F-35A for high-threat penetration, first-day coalition operations, and missions where stealth and U.S.-integrated data architecture are decisive. With the proposed force of 140 fighters, Canada would need to expand pilot production, instructor capacity, weapons training, simulator hours, technician pipelines, logistics management, munitions handling, secure mission-data support, and deployable maintenance units.
Two fighter types would also create separate conversion courses, flight manuals, ground-support equipment, diagnostic systems, spares catalogues, depot relationships, software update procedures, and maintenance qualifications. Common NATO weapons would reduce some friction, but the F-35A and Gripen E would still have different engines, radars, electronic warfare suites, mission computers, support equipment, classified data requirements, and upgrade pathways. The timing is unfavorable because the RCAF would be retiring CF-18s, introducing the F-35A, potentially standing up Gripen E squadrons, and absorbing GlobalEye AEW&C aircraft in the same broad period.
If Canada buys airframes faster than it trains crews and technicians, the result would be inventory without sortie generation. For the 140-aircraft option to be more than a procurement headline, Ottawa is likely analyzing funded plans for spare engines, simulators, weapons stocks, deployable maintenance kits, secure data facilities, northern operating sites, hardened communications, and long-term software sustainment before the new fleets reach operational maturity. The GlobalEye decision is central to the Gripen’s return because Canada’s northern air defence problem is a sensor and command-and-control problem before it is an interceptor problem.
Canada is negotiating for five to six Saab GlobalEye AEW&C aircraft with a program value above C$5 billion. The aircraft uses the Bombardier Global 6000 or Global 6500 airframe, tying the program directly to Canadian aerospace production. Its mission suite combines the Erieye ER S-band AESA radar, Leonardo Seaspray 7500E maritime radar, electro-optical and infrared sensors, SIGINT equipment, Link 16, satellite communications, and onboard command-and-control workstations. Its air-search performance includes a 450 km detection range against conventional airborne targets and up to 550 km at high altitude, with endurance of 11 to 13 hours and range above 11,000 km.
The dorsal Erieye radar gives about 300-degree main-radar coverage, and Saab has offered forward- and aft-looking radar additions if Canada requires broader coverage. This matters for NORAD because Canada covers 9.98 million km² and faces long Arctic, Atlantic, and Pacific approaches where fixed radars cannot continuously see low-altitude threats. The North Warning System, including AN/FPS-117 and AN/FPS-124 arrays, was built mainly for Cold War bomber detection and is now less effective against low-altitude cruise missiles, drones, and smaller radar-cross-section targets. AEW&C aircraft operating at altitude extend radar horizon by several hundred kilometers, giving fighters earlier cueing against cruise missiles, drones, low-flying aircraft, maritime targets, and incursions.
The industrial case is unusually specific and carries both opportunity and fixed-cost risk. Saab’s Canadian Gripen model includes final assembly, integration, testing, sustainment, mission-system upgrades, and secure data control inside Canada, rather than only F-35 parts manufacturing inside a foreign-led supply chain. The proposed footprint includes a Gripen Centre in Montreal, a Cyber Resilience Centre in Toronto, a Sensor Centre in Vancouver, and an Aerospace Research and Development Centre in Montreal. Named partners include IMP Aerospace and Defence, CAE, Arcfield Canada, and GE Aviation.
A 72-Gripen purchase could create up to 9,000 Canadian jobs, and Saab’s earlier 72 Gripen plus six GlobalEye package was linked to up to 12,600 jobs. About one-third of the projected GlobalEye production over 15 years could take place inside Canada if allied orders develop. Ukraine has been linked to a future requirement of 100 to 150 Gripen Es, while NATO and European customers could add GlobalEye demand. If those orders materialize, Canadian facilities could serve more than the RCAF and carry workload beyond the initial domestic buy. If they do not, only in the worst-case scenario, Canada could be left funding an assembly and sustainment base for a single batch of 72 fighters, with fewer economies of scale and higher fixed costs per aircraft over the life of the program.
Still, the strategic logic of the new mixed force is coherent only if each layer performs a distinct function. F-35As would provide the low-observable and upper combat layer; the Gripen E would provide aircraft mass, daily air-defence capacity, and a more nationally controlled sustainment base; the GlobalEye would provide airborne surveillance, maritime tracking, and battle management over northern and maritime approaches. A 140-aircraft fighter inventory would improve maintenance rotation, training depth, alert coverage, NATO deployment capacity, and attrition planning.
It would also commit Canada to two fighter logistics systems, one AEW&C fleet, multiple software ecosystems, expanded weapons stocks, northern infrastructure, and a larger aerospace-industrial base. If Ottawa funds those elements for 30 to 40 years, the mixed fleet would reduce single-supplier exposure and give Canada a larger, more distributed air defence force. If it funds only the aircraft contracts, which is unlikely, the RCAF would inherit complexity faster than it can turn that complexity into combat-ready sorties.
Written by Jérôme Brahy
Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
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The Canadian federal government is evaluating a major procurement proposal to expand its planned fighter inventory into a mixed fleet of approximately 140 aircraft. The strategic initiative considers pairing 72 to 88 American-made Lockheed Martin F-35A Lightning II stealth fighters with up to 72 Canadian-assembled Saab Gripen E aircraft. This potential structural realignment follows an ongoing defense review initiated by the Carney administration to mitigate reliance on United States military supply chains and maximize domestic aerospace industrial benefits.
The proposed procurement framework expands the Royal Canadian Air Force fighter fleet from its original 88-aircraft projection to a three-tier layout comprising the F-35A for low-observable missions, the Gripen E for routine air defense, and the Saab GlobalEye for airborne early warning. This 140-aircraft baseline represents a return to Cold War-era operational capacities to address modern NORAD, Arctic surveillance, and NATO territorial sovereignty commitments.
Related topic: Canada considers cancelling part of U.S. F-35 order to buy 60 Swedish Gripen fighters
Canada is evaluating a major proposal to expand its planned fighter inventory into a mixed fleet of approximately 140 fighter jets, pairing 72 to 88 American-made F-35As with up to 72 Canadian-assembled Saab Gripen Es. (Picture source: NATO Air Command)
On June 6, 2026, CBC News reported that Canada was examining a proposal that could expand the planned fleet of 88 F-35As to a mixed fleet of about 140 fighter jets, combining 72 to 88 American F-35As with up to 72 Swedish Gripen Es assembled in Canada. La Presse had earlier placed the working mixed-fleet option at about 30 F-35As and 60 Gripen Es. The higher 140-aircraft option would move Canada from an Air Force structured around a single U.S.-made aircraft to a three-part layout: F-35A for low-observable and coalition missions, Gripen E for fighter mass and routine air defence, and GlobalEye for airborne surveillance and battle management.
Canada already has a firm order for 16 F-35As under a January 2023 agreement and paid for long-lead components for 14 additional airframes, but Ottawa has not politically closed the question of whether the full 88-aircraft F-35A plan should proceed. Canada operated 138 CF-18s in the 1980s, while the current CF-18 force is below 88 aircraft. A 140-aircraft inventory would therefore not be an abstract expansion, but a return to a Cold War-scale fighter force at a time when NORAD modernization, Arctic surveillance, missile warning, NATO commitments, U.S. tariff threats, national sovereignty, and industrial returns are all competing inside the same procurement decision.
Canada joined the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program in 1997, announced a 65-aircraft F-35 plan in 2010, and then moved into a more contested procurement process after cost and governance concerns. In December 2017, Ottawa launched an open competition for 88 fighters that included the F-35, Gripen, Rafale, Eurofighter Typhoon, and Super Hornet. Saab submitted its Gripen E proposal on July 31, 2020, built around Canadian assembly, sustainment, training, and technology transfer. Canada selected the F-35A and signed the January 2023 agreement for 88 aircraft, in an acquisition valued at C$19 billion, while broader program costs were later estimated at above C$27 billion.
The Carney government then ordered a review on March 15, 2025, one day after Mark Carney became prime minister, after renewed U.S. tariff pressure and a wider deterioration in bilateral trust highlighted Canada’s exposure to U.S.-controlled defence supply chains. Carney stated on March 25, 2025, that Canada could keep the 16 committed F-35As while examining other manufacturers for the remainder, and Defence Minister David McGuinty told Parliament on April 27, 2026, that the review remained underway and that Canada could still buy foreign fighters in addition to or instead of part of the original F-35 plan. The core F-35 issue is not whether the aircraft gives Canada a capability that the Gripen does not. It does.
The F-35A brings low observability, fused sensor data, electronic intelligence collection, passive detection options, secure data links, and compatibility with U.S.-led future air operations. A force of 72 to 88 F-35As would give the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) enough depth to allocate stealth fighters to NORAD quick-reaction alert, NATO rotations, operational conversion, training squadrons, maintenance downtime, and attrition reserve. The earlier 30-aircraft F-35A mixed-fleet option reported by La Presse would preserve access to the F-35’s capabilities, but it would sharply compress availability during overlapping crises, for example, if Canada needed fighters for NORAD alert in the north, NATO deterrence in Europe, pilot conversion, and depot-level maintenance at the same time.
The first 16 F-35As are effectively locked into the force, while the 14 aircraft tied to long-lead payments preserve production slots without equaling a final commitment to all 88. Lockheed Martin’s Canadian industrial case includes about 4,500 jobs, more than 30 Canadian companies, and projected opportunities of roughly C$15.5 billion through 2058, but the tradeoff is a sustainment model in which software releases, mission-data files, classified reprogramming, depot access, maintenance procedures, and future weapons integration remain embedded in a strict U.S.-controlled ecosystem. Therefore, the Swedish Gripen E would not replicate the F-35A’s role; it would change the balance between fleet size, national control, operating burden, and routine availability.
Saab’s fighter is powered by the GE F414-GE-39E turbofan producing about 98 kN of thrust with afterburner, reaches Mach 2, has a maximum takeoff weight of 16,500 kg, carries 10 external hardpoints, and has a combat radius of about 810 nautical miles with aerial refuelling. Its weapons options include Meteor missiles for beyond-visual-range air combat, IRIS-T for short-range engagements, AIM-120 AMRAAM for NATO interoperability, Taurus KEPD 350 for stand-off strike, precision-guided bombs, reconnaissance pods, and anti-ship weapons, depending on what Canada chooses to integrate. Its combat systems include the Raven ES-05 AESA radar, Skyward-G IRST, radar warning receivers, missile-approach warning, electronic countermeasures, and active expendable decoys.
Its most relevant Canadian attribute is the dispersed-operations model: short-runway use, road-based operations, rapid refuelling and rearming, and maintenance by small ground teams. That gives the Swedish fighter a plausible role in Arctic patrol, domestic air defence, NORAD alert reinforcement, pilot training throughput, and lower-cost daily flying, while leaving the F-35A for high-threat penetration, first-day coalition operations, and missions where stealth and U.S.-integrated data architecture are decisive. With the proposed force of 140 fighters, Canada would need to expand pilot production, instructor capacity, weapons training, simulator hours, technician pipelines, logistics management, munitions handling, secure mission-data support, and deployable maintenance units.
Two fighter types would also create separate conversion courses, flight manuals, ground-support equipment, diagnostic systems, spares catalogues, depot relationships, software update procedures, and maintenance qualifications. Common NATO weapons would reduce some friction, but the F-35A and Gripen E would still have different engines, radars, electronic warfare suites, mission computers, support equipment, classified data requirements, and upgrade pathways. The timing is unfavorable because the RCAF would be retiring CF-18s, introducing the F-35A, potentially standing up Gripen E squadrons, and absorbing GlobalEye AEW&C aircraft in the same broad period.
If Canada buys airframes faster than it trains crews and technicians, the result would be inventory without sortie generation. For the 140-aircraft option to be more than a procurement headline, Ottawa is likely analyzing funded plans for spare engines, simulators, weapons stocks, deployable maintenance kits, secure data facilities, northern operating sites, hardened communications, and long-term software sustainment before the new fleets reach operational maturity. The GlobalEye decision is central to the Gripen’s return because Canada’s northern air defence problem is a sensor and command-and-control problem before it is an interceptor problem.
Canada is negotiating for five to six Saab GlobalEye AEW&C aircraft with a program value above C$5 billion. The aircraft uses the Bombardier Global 6000 or Global 6500 airframe, tying the program directly to Canadian aerospace production. Its mission suite combines the Erieye ER S-band AESA radar, Leonardo Seaspray 7500E maritime radar, electro-optical and infrared sensors, SIGINT equipment, Link 16, satellite communications, and onboard command-and-control workstations. Its air-search performance includes a 450 km detection range against conventional airborne targets and up to 550 km at high altitude, with endurance of 11 to 13 hours and range above 11,000 km.
The dorsal Erieye radar gives about 300-degree main-radar coverage, and Saab has offered forward- and aft-looking radar additions if Canada requires broader coverage. This matters for NORAD because Canada covers 9.98 million km² and faces long Arctic, Atlantic, and Pacific approaches where fixed radars cannot continuously see low-altitude threats. The North Warning System, including AN/FPS-117 and AN/FPS-124 arrays, was built mainly for Cold War bomber detection and is now less effective against low-altitude cruise missiles, drones, and smaller radar-cross-section targets. AEW&C aircraft operating at altitude extend radar horizon by several hundred kilometers, giving fighters earlier cueing against cruise missiles, drones, low-flying aircraft, maritime targets, and incursions.
The industrial case is unusually specific and carries both opportunity and fixed-cost risk. Saab’s Canadian Gripen model includes final assembly, integration, testing, sustainment, mission-system upgrades, and secure data control inside Canada, rather than only F-35 parts manufacturing inside a foreign-led supply chain. The proposed footprint includes a Gripen Centre in Montreal, a Cyber Resilience Centre in Toronto, a Sensor Centre in Vancouver, and an Aerospace Research and Development Centre in Montreal. Named partners include IMP Aerospace and Defence, CAE, Arcfield Canada, and GE Aviation.
A 72-Gripen purchase could create up to 9,000 Canadian jobs, and Saab’s earlier 72 Gripen plus six GlobalEye package was linked to up to 12,600 jobs. About one-third of the projected GlobalEye production over 15 years could take place inside Canada if allied orders develop. Ukraine has been linked to a future requirement of 100 to 150 Gripen Es, while NATO and European customers could add GlobalEye demand. If those orders materialize, Canadian facilities could serve more than the RCAF and carry workload beyond the initial domestic buy. If they do not, only in the worst-case scenario, Canada could be left funding an assembly and sustainment base for a single batch of 72 fighters, with fewer economies of scale and higher fixed costs per aircraft over the life of the program.
Still, the strategic logic of the new mixed force is coherent only if each layer performs a distinct function. F-35As would provide the low-observable and upper combat layer; the Gripen E would provide aircraft mass, daily air-defence capacity, and a more nationally controlled sustainment base; the GlobalEye would provide airborne surveillance, maritime tracking, and battle management over northern and maritime approaches. A 140-aircraft fighter inventory would improve maintenance rotation, training depth, alert coverage, NATO deployment capacity, and attrition planning.
It would also commit Canada to two fighter logistics systems, one AEW&C fleet, multiple software ecosystems, expanded weapons stocks, northern infrastructure, and a larger aerospace-industrial base. If Ottawa funds those elements for 30 to 40 years, the mixed fleet would reduce single-supplier exposure and give Canada a larger, more distributed air defence force. If it funds only the aircraft contracts, which is unlikely, the RCAF would inherit complexity faster than it can turn that complexity into combat-ready sorties.
Written by Jérôme Brahy
Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
Explore More Defense News
• Land Defense News
• Naval Defense News
• Defense Aerospace News
